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FIRST, DO NO HARM: WHY DOCTORS ARE NOT
OMNIPOTENT UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Sharona Hoffinan •

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act1 ("ADA") was designed to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate forthe elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"2 as well as those
who are wrongly regarded as having a disabiiity. 3 Under the ADA,
employers are prohibited from discriminating against individuals with
respect to hiring, firing, promotion, and otheremployment decisions. 4
The statute, however, does not forbid employers from requiring
applicants for employment to undergo physical examinations, nor from
basing employment decisions upon .the results of medical screening. 5 The
.
ADA provides no explicit guidance as to what responsibility the
employer retains under the Act once it has sent the candidate to the
physician. And therein lies the problem: if the physician concludes that

"' B.A.,l985, Wellesley College; J.D., 1988, Harvard Law School. Ms. Hoffinan is a Senior
Trial Attorney in the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission's Houston District Office and an
adjunct professor at South Texas College of Law. The views .expressed in this article represent the
personal views and opinions of its author and are not intended to represent the views of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission or any other United States governmental agency.
I. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. !d.§ 1210l(b)(l).
3. See id. § 121 02(2)(C).
4. See id. § 121 12(a).
5. See id. § 121 12(d)(3r The physical examination may be conducted only after an offer of
employment has been extended to a c~didate. The offer must be a bona fide offer which is
conditioned only upon the results of the medical examination. See id. Moreover, if the physical
examination reveals a physical or mental limitation which rises to the level of a disability in a
candidate who is otherwise qualified for the job, the employer must offer the employee a ieasonable
accommodation unless it can show that the needed accommodation would impose·an undue hardship
upon the operation of its business. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
·
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the o;employer should not hire an individuaV can the employer rely
unquestioninglyuponthe doctor's recommendation in making an adverse
employment decision? What jf the doctor's conclusion is based upon
prejudice and misconception rather than upon relevant inedical data?
What if the doctor disqualifies the -individual not because he or she is
physically incapable of performing. the essential job duties with or
without a reasonable accommodation, but because the individual is
overw~ig)Jt, b,as ~ p_a.st_llis!OJY of cancer, or has some medical condition
which requires expensive tr~atrnent and ~11 raise the employer's
insurance costs? Must the employer then send all individuals who have
received a- negative evaluation from the physician to another doctor for
a second opinion? Should the company attempt to assess on its own
whether following-the doctor's advice would cause it to violate the antidiscrilnina:tion mandate of the ADA? If so, how should it go about doing
... -·
so?
This articl~ argues that employers are not shielded from liability
under the ADA if they rely upon the advice of a doctor in making an
adverse employment decision. The question of the extent to which
employers can rely upon .the opinion. of a single doctor for purposes of
avoidilig liability und~r the ADA is a significant question of statutory
iilterpretation. According toone study, approximately forty-nine percent
of new employees SUrVeyed were required to undergo pre-employment
medical examinations. 7 In rejecting an applicant, it is not uncommon for
employers to rely exclusively upon the advice of a doctor without any
further~~lygs_.a.sto_vyl!c;;tll~r t)Je candidate could perform the job duties
in question in light of the medical condition diagnosed by the physician. 8 The ADA's prohibition of disability discrimination would be
rendered nearly meaningless if an employer could blindly accept the
negative recommendation of its doctor, no matter how baseless or
contrary to law the recommendation is.

6. The arguments developed in this article can also be applied to situations in which an
employer sends a current employee ·io a physician and subsequently decides to tenninate the
individual based upon the doctor's recommendlltion. For the sake of simplicity, however, the author
will ref'er in the .text mily to the more common scenario in which the individual is not yet an
employee arid the employer ba8es an adverse hiring decision upon the results of a pre-employment
·
physical.
7. See JayS. Himmelstein, Worker Fitness and Risk Evaluations in Context, 3 OCCUPATIONAL
MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS 169, 176 (1988) (citation omitted).
8. See Gary Taylor, Note From the Doctor Can Land Employers in Court, NAT'L L.J., June
10, 1996, at B-I'.
.
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The author concludes that an employer's reliance upon the opinion
of a doctor for purposes of rejecting an applicant does not establish a
defense under the ADA. If the employer's refusal to hire an individual
constitutes a violation of the ADA, the physician's involvement in the
decision-making probess'doe~diot alleviate the employer's responsibility
for the discriminatory act and does not eliminate liability under the
statute.
This thesis is bolstered by a recent case litigated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Coinmission ("EEOC") against a Houston bus
company, Texas Bus Lines, Inc. 9 In resolving the issues of liability on
summary judgment, a district court determined the following:
If an employer's relationship with a physician who conducts a medical
examination resUlts in the discriminatory rejection of applicants
protected by the ADA, the employer is liable for a violation of the

statute despite the involvement of a third party, the doctor, with whom
the employer had a professional arrangement. 10
In formulating this argument, the article will analyze the Texas Bus
Lines case and its implications. The relevant language of the ADA and
its implementing regtllations \vill also be examined. Finally, the paper
will outline means by which employers who rely upon medical examinations fu making hiring decisions may insure compliance with ADA
requirements.

9. See EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
10. Jd. at 982. The opinion grantf;d the EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment only in
part since the court mled against the EEOC on one issue. See id. The court found that Texas Bus
Lines did not violate the ADA when it included medical questions on its application form. See id.
The EEOC had contended that this practice was contrary to the ADA's mandate that medical
examinations could be conducted only after a conditional job offer is extended to a candidate and
that no medical inquiries could be made of applicants prior to that time. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(2)(A)-(3) (1994). The court held that because the Department of Transportation
Regulations specify that particular medical conditions disqualify individuals from employment as
drivers, Texas Bus Lines did not violate the ADA by including questions as to those conditions on
its application form. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 981. The decision thus appears limited
to medical questions asked by companies subject to DOT regulations. See id. It should also be noted
that Texas Bus Lines· voluntarily eliminated the medical inquiries from its application form in
September of 1994, after befug advised to do so by the EEOC. See id. at 968 n.2.
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IT. EEOC V. TEXAS Bus LINES: THE

FACTS OF TIIE

CASE

AND

Irs

RULING

Ms. · Arezella Manuel; an experienced bus driver, applied for
employment at Texas Bus Lines in March :of 1994. She was five· feet
seven inches tall arid weighed 345 pounds: 11
Ms, _Ma,tlUJ~Lfill~(LQ!!lJ!IL~;tppllc;:ttion for employment at Texas Bus
Lines on March 2~~ 1994. 1 ~ .On the. application form she provided
information about her full employment history and indicated that she had
won a safety award at a previous jobY She then had a personal
interview with· a manager . named Larry Evans. 14 Mr; Evans · was
impressed by Ms .. Manuel's job experien.ce and by the references given
byher former: employers. 1s.During her half hour interview, Mr. Evans
found. Ms. 1\tt:anp.el'to be.yery personable and concluqe&d'that she would
be congenial
polite to passengers. 16 Upon checking her credentialS;
Evans determined that Manuel's driving record was "clean."17 He
testified that he did not believe that.Ms, Manuel moved awkwardly when
she entered the room ·and sat down .and "did not think that she was
heavier than !llan:f of the other Orivers _hired by Texas Bus Lines." 18
Mr. Evans, a manager with 19 years of experience in.the.transportation industry; was not at all troubled by Manuel's obesity and did not
believe that it would impede her performance in any way. Evans, in fact,
was so convinced by· Ms. Manuel's qualifications, that he extended a
conditional offer of employment to her. 19

and

r-<

II. See :Texas B!is Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967 n.l. A person is considered to be "morbidly
obese if she weighs either more than twice her optimal weight or. more than 100 pounds over her
optimal weight." Cook v. Rhode Island, Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosp., 10 F.3d 17,
20 n.l (1st Cir. ·1993). The .Texas Bus .Lines court noted that according to medical charts, Ms.
Manuel "should weigh between·122_and 154 pounds," and that "[a]t 35.4 pounds," she was "clearly
over twice .her optimal weight ...." Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967 n.l.
12. !d. at 967.
.~
13. S~e Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability Exhibit 3,
EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (No. H-95-3981).
14. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 971.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. !d.
18. !d.
19. Seeid.
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Ms. Manuel's job offer was conditioned upon her passing a driving
test, a medical examination, and a motor vehicle check.20 When she
took her driving test on March 8, 1994, Ms. Manuel was deemed
qualified with respect to all of the tasks which she performed and
received no negative commentsin the ''remarks" section of the Certification of Road Test.21 The certification form indicates that she operated
the vehicle controls well, had good· driving posture, ·and correctly exited
the vehicle to check before backing the van. 22 The examiner signed the
following statement on the certification form: "It is my considered
opinion that this driver possesses sufficient driving skill to operate safely
the type of commercial·motor vehicle listed above [a van]."23
·Later that day, Arezella Manuel underwent a medical examination,
as required- of all drivers who are to work for a company subject to the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations ("DOT Regulations"). 24 Ms.
Manuel's physical examination form reveals that she was assessed as
being "normal" in all. categories. 25 The exam disclosed no' medical
problems of any kind. 26 The doctor's certification, however, states the
following: ''Patient can't move around swiftly in case of an accident.
(Does not meet DOT regulatioils)." 27
· The examining physician, Dr. James Norwood Frierson, admitted
that he examined Ms. Manuel for only five or six minutes. 28 The doctor

20. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability Exhibit 3; EEOC
v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (No. H-95-3981).
Under EEOC policy, in order to be a bona fide conditional offer of employment, such an
offer must be conditioned only upon the results of the medical examination and be extended only
after all other data regarding the applicant is verified. Furthermore,
[s]ince an employer can ask disability-related questions and require medical examinations
after a job offer, it is important that the job offer be real. A job offer is real if the
employer has evaluated all relevant non-medical information which it reasonably could
have obtained and analyzed prior to giving the offer.
See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT .. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
PREEMPLOYMENT DISABILITY RELATED QUESTIONS AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS 18 (1995).
Altliough the EEOC chose not to litigate this issue in TeXaS Bus Lines, the company's practice of
conditioning the job offer upon several further steps in the application process still constitutes a
technical violation of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1994).
21. See Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the Issue of Liability Exhibit 3, EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) (No. H-95-3981).
22. See id.
23. ld.
24. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 391.43 (1995)).
25. Id. at 978.
26. See id.
27. Jd.
28. See id.
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boncludedthat Ms. Manuel was not sufficiently mobile based solely upon
his observation that she had difficulty getting out of her seat in the
waiting area and that she ''waddled" slowly to the examining room,
which was eight doors awa~. 29 Dr. Frierson further testified that he had
no· specific training regarding.the duties· of bus drivers,. motor vehicle
safety, or the. dynamics and consequences ·.of various auto accidents. 30
He based his deCision coiicernirig Ms. MllJJuel 's. effectiveness in case of
an accidenLpurely~uponhis,obs~rvationofMs .. Manuel as she walked to
the examin.ingroom and upon his personal experience as a bus passen31
.
ger. ·
. · · ·.
· ·. · · .
·
· .·
The DOT regulations do not establish any weight restrictiO]lS for bus
drivers. 32 The regulations mandate that a candidate imist be "physically
qualified to drive a commercialmotor vehicle in accordance with subpart
E-Physical Qualifications and Exaininations of part 391."33 Subpart E,
section. 391.41 qf the re~latiQns, d~tails the· condi)iohs which may
disqualify a p"oteniial ctriver. 3,4 These include thirteen categories of
ailments, such as'. alcoholism, particular mental diseases, serious
impairments of .various limbs, etc} 5 Obesity is• not listed. ·ill any
category as a disqualifying condition. Impaired mobility per se is _also not
listed as. a disqualifying condition. 36 . Rather, the regulations 'specify that

29.
30.
31.
32.

ld.
See id. at 976.77~
See id. at ~76-78.
See-id.. at973.
.
33. 49 C.F.& § 39i.ll(6) (1995).
34; See idi § 391.41'.
35 .. See·id. · ':
36. · See id. The relevanttext of thjs provision is as follows:
(a) A person shali not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is physically
qualified to do so and, except as provided in § 39 L67, has on his/her person the original,
or a photographic. copy, of a medical examiner's certificate that he/she is physically
qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle.
(b) A-person is physically qualified-to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that person:
. (I) Ha5 no loss of a foot, a leg, a hand, or an arm, or has been granted a waiver
pursuant to § .391.49;
(2) -Hils no impairment of:
(i) A himd. or finger which interferes with preh~nsion or power grasping; or.
' . (ii) An_
foot, or leg which interferes with the ability to perform normal
tasks associ~t~d with opetatiiig a. commercial motor vehicle; or any other
sigillficant limb defect or liinitation which interferes with the ability to·
-perfol'n1,niii'inal tasks associated with operating a. commercial motor vehicle;
,
ot has been grant¢d a waiver pursuant to § 391.49.
(3) Has no established med.ical history or clinical diagnosis of diabetes mellitus
currently requiring illiiulin. for control; '
.

arm;
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a driver must not have an impairment of "[a]n arm, foot, or leg whieh
interferes with the ability to perform nonnal . tasks .associated with
operating a commercial motor vehicle; or any· other· significant limb
defect or limitation which interferes with the ability to perform normal
tasks ·associated with op~rating a' commercial motor vehicle."37 Thus,
the regulations do ·not ·address the issue of a driver's ability to handle
extreme· •emergency situations.
When its . doctor- refused to provide Manuel with ·a medical
certification, Texas Bus Lines informed her that she would not be hired

.(4) Has no current clinical diagnosis of ~yocardial infar~tion, angina pectorls,
coronary insufficiency, thrombosis, or any other cardiovascular disease of avariety
known to be accompanied by syncope, dyspnea, collapse; or congestive c~diac
failur~ .. · . ..
.
.
(~) · Has no established . medical history or clinical diagnosis of a respiratory
dysfunctiim likely to interfere with his/her ability to control and drive a cominercial·
motor vehicle safely;
(6) ;Has no qurrent clinical diagnosis of high blood presswe likely to interf~re with
·
his/her apility to operate a commercia] motor. vehicle safely;
(7) Has no establish!'!d medical lllsJory or cli~ical diagnosis of rheumatic, aithrii:ic,
orthopedic; muscular; neuiornus'Cuiar, oi vascular disease which interfenis·witb ·.
his/her ability to control and operate a commercial motor vehicle safely;
(8) Has no establ~hed medical history or clinical diagnosis of epilepsy. or any otl:ler
condition which is likely to cause loss of consciousness or any loss of ability to
control a· commercial motor vehicle;
(9) Ha.S no mental, nervous, organic, or functional disease or· psychiatric disoider
likely to interfere with his/her ability to drive a commercial motor veq.icle safely;
(1 0) Has distant visual acuity ·of· at least 20/40 (Snellen) in each eye ·without
corrective lenses or visuaJ.acuity separately corrected to 20/40. (Snellen). or better
with· corrective lenses, pistant binocular acuity of at .least 20/40 (Snellen) in. both
eyes with or without corrective lenses, field of vision of at least 70 degrees in the
horiwntal Meridian in each eye, and th.\! ability to recognize the colors. of traffic
signals and devices showing standard red, green, and amber;
(11) First perceives a .forced whispered voice in the better ear at not less than :5 feet
with or without the use of a hearing aid or, if testecl l:JY use of an audiometric
device, does not have an average hearing loss in the better ear greater than 40
decibels at 500Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz with or without a hearing aid when the
audiometric device is calibrated to American National Standard (forinerly ASA
Standard) Z24.S.:-1951.
(12) Does not use a Schedule I drug or other substance identified in appendix D to
this subchapter,.an amphetamine, a narcotic, or any other habit-forming di-ug, except
that a driver may use such a substance or drug if the substance or. drug is prescribed
by a licensed medical practitioner who is familiar with the driver's it)edical history
and as8igned duties and who has advised the driver that the prescribed substance
or drug will not adversely affect the driver's ability to safely operate a commercial
motor vehicle; and
·
(13) Has no current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism.
/d.§ 391.4l(a)-(b).
37. /d. § 391.4I(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
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by the company.38 The Court found that the company "impermissibly
discriminated against Arezella Manuel on the basis of a perceived
disability in violation of 42 U.S;C. § 12101 et seq."39 Specifically, the
Court ruled as follows:
Because Texas Bus Lines could determine from Dr. Frierson's
•examination report that his opinion was not supported by any objective
.m~-!!1£9!J!!ldmg§,;,@~Lb~.c:a,JJ~Le; T!'!i'as.J3us J.Jjnf)s knew. or should have
k;n9\Vl). tllat.l).r. ~Frierson's conclusion that Manuel was not physically
quali;fied for the driver position was not based on the DOT Regulations,
Texa,s B¥s.Lines' reliance on Dr. Frierson's opinion was unreasonable.
Texas Bu5 ~iries knew or should have known that its refusal to hire
Manuel on'tlie basis of Dr. Frierson's faulty opinion was both improper
and \riolative of the ADA 40

,~

Since DOT regulations require that drivers po~se·ss a medical
exanllri~:f'~' certificate, the court recognized that the bus company could
not hire Manuel without the appropriate documentation. 41 However, the
opinion ac)vised ·that Texas Bus Lines could have sent Manuel to a
seconci doctor to obtain the necessary c~rtification. 42 The Court concluded that "[b]ecause Texas Bus Lines' relationship witb Dr. Frierson
resulted in the discriminatory rejection of Manuel, an individual protected
l:iy the ADA, Texas Bus Lines is liable for a violation of the ADA." 43
The company's reliance upon the opinion of a medical expert in making
its adverse. employment decision did not shield it from liability under the
statute.44 The Court's unprecedented ruling may well have far reaching
i1llplicatiops ·for similar cases in the future.

38. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967-68.
39. !d. at 98L
40. !d. at 973.
41. See id. at 967.
42. See id. at 978.
43. 1d. at 974.
44. See id. at 973-74. The damages aspect of the case was settled pursuant to a consent decree,
which awarded damages to Manuel and provided the injunctive relief requested by the EEOC. See
Consent Order Decree at 2-3, EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. I 996) (No.
H-95-3981). Texas Bus Lines agreed to provide ADA training to its examining physicians and
management employees. !d. at 3. It also agreed to designate a manager who would review all
negative hiring recommendations made by its doctor to insure that the company's employment
decisions remain consistent with the requirements of DOT regulations and the ADA. !d.
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THE "REGARDED As" THEORY: WHY INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE
NOT DISABLED ARE COVERED BY THE ADA

In Texas Bus Lines, the Court found that the examining physician
erroneously deemed an applicant for employment to be incapable of
performing a job even·though the individual had no medical condition
which would in any· way impede her job performance. 45 While Ms.
Manuel was an experienced, qualified driver who was in good health, the
doctor disqualified her based cin a hypothetical concern that she would
not be able to move quickly to assist passengers in case of an acci:dent.46 One might assume that individuais such as Ms. Manuel, who are
not in fact disabled but are disqualified due to a doctor's error or
misconception, are not protected under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. The statute and its. implementing regulations, however, establish
otherwise. The Act provides:
No coyered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and othc;:r terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.47
For an impairnient to rise to the level of a disability, it must
substantially limit one or more of a person;s major life activities. 48 The
regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA define the term "major life
activities" to mean "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.'>4 9 The regulations further explain that
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working (i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 973.
See id. at 980.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
See id. § 12102(2)(A).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (1995).
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job does not constitUte a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working. 5°

An individual can.thus be "disabled" for purposes of protection tinder the
ADA due solely to
or her Jnability to_perform a particular category
of work, such. as professio~~(.driVing, "o~ av~ety of jobs of different
types. If,· however, . a..medicaL condition prevents an individual from
.perfoiming only the speci~liz~d tasks of a. single, unique job or a small
categoryofjohs;··the;[individualwill not be covered by the ADA. 51 The
Act applies oply to persons who are unemployable in a larger sense of
th~ word.
.
.
Iii order to falf withiri the statutory scope, an individual need not be
actually disabled. Rather, the ADA also covers individuals who have a
"record of' a disability or who are· "regarded as" having a disability. 52
Consequently, if 'an employer makes an adverse emplqyment decision
concerning an .mdividtial whom it Wrongly regards as substantially
limited in his or her ability to perform a major life function, including
working, that employer may be grtilty of a violation of the ADA. 53
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA further elucidate
.
this concept:

his

Is regarded as having such an impairment means:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as
constitUting such limitation;
(2) Ha8 a physical.or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a resUlt of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(l) or
(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a
substantially limiting impairment. 54
.

'

. ' .

Claims based upon the "regarded as" component ofthe definition
of a disabled individual have been evaluated and discussed by several
courts. In Milton v. Bob Maddox Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 55 , for exam-

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

!d. § I 630.2(j)(3)(i).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
!d. § 121 02(2)(B)-(C).
See id.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(l) (1995).
868 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
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pie, the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating
the following:
Finally, Milton may qualify for ADA coverage via another route. If he
can demonstrate that he was simply regarded by his colleagues as
having a physical impairment substantially limitin:g a major life activity,
and that this perception led to his disn:iissal, the ADA applies. 56

In assessing the disability discrimination claim brought by an obese
womanunder sectiori. 504 .of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,57 the First
Circuit, in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health,
Retardation, & Hospitals, 58 stated that "[a]n unfounded assumption that
an applicant is unqualified for a particular job, even if arrived at in good
faith, is not sufficient to forestall liability" under the Act. 59 The Court
found that defendant's articulated reasons for refusing to hire the
plaintiff, including its concern that "Cook's limited mobility impeded her
ability to evacuate patients in case of an emergency. . . . show conclusively that Ml:IRH treated plaintiff's obesity as if it actually affected her
musculoskeletal and cardiovascular systems."60
The rationale for including individuals regarded as disabled within
the ADA~s definition· of "disabled" waS fu~iculated by the Supreme Court
iil School Board of Nassau County v. Arline61 in the context of the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court explained:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not
only those who ate actually physically impaired, but also those who are
regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially lin:iited in

56. /d. at 325; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994) (defining disability); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(g)(3) (1995) (defining "is regarded as having such impairment''); see also Pritchard v.
Southern Co. Servs., 4 AD Cas. 465 (BNA) 473 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff failed
to show that the defendant regarded her as disabled).
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act are often applied to
the ADA, a much newer law for which only a limited body of interpretive case law exists. The
C.F.R. establishes that, in general, the regulations promulgated to implement the ADA do not apply
a lesser standard "than the standards applied under [Title V of] the Rehabilitation Act of 1973," or
the regulations issued by federal agencies pursuant to that title. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.l(h)-(c) (1995).
Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act itself provides that "[t]he standards used to determine whether
this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section
shall be the standards applied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ...."
29 U.S.C. § 79l(g) (1994) (citation omitted).
58. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
59. /d. at 27.
60. /d. at 23.
61. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are
the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. 62

In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations states that:
if an individual can show that an employer or other covered entity
made an employment decision because of a perception of disability
based on "myth, fear or stereotype," the individual will satisfY the
"regarded as" part of the definition of disability. If the employer cannot
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, an
inference that the employer is acting on the basis of "myth, fear or
stereotype" can be drawn. 63

If an individual is not in actu_ality substantially limited in performing
any major life activity but is deemed disqualified for ::1 job by a doctor
due to a particular physical condition, the. individual may nonetheless
enjoy the protection of the ADA. 64 An applicant who has been found
qualified and been offered a job may not be rejected solely due to myths
or unsubstantiated fears regarding conditions such as epilepsy, HIV,
diabetes, etc., of which the employer learns via a pre-employment
medical examination. 65
IV. WHY Is AN EMPLOYER F.ESPONSIBLE FOR THE
RECOMMENDATION OF ITS MEDICAL EXPERT WHO ERRS

IN ASSESSING A CANDIDATE?

It may seem that if a physician mistakenly deems an applicant to be
unqualified for a particular job, the doctor rather than the employer
should be held liable for the harm suffered by the rejected candidate.
Under the ADA, only "an employer, employment agency, labor
organization or joint labor-management committee" cru1 be sued for a
violation of the statute. 66 In Cmparts Distribution Center Inc. v.

62.
63.
64.
65.

!d. at 284.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(1) (1995).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C) (1994).
See id.

66. id. § 12111(2). Section 102 of the Act mandates that "[n)o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." !d.
§ 12112(a). Section 101 of the Act defines a "covered entity" as "an employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." /d. § 12111(2).
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Automotive Wholesaler's Ass 'n, 67 the First Circuit ruled that third
parties could be considered "employers" under certain circumstances. 68
The Court determined that defendants,- members of an administering trust
for a health benefit plan, would be considered employers "if they
exercised control ·over an important aspect of ... [the employee's]
employment."69 Furthermore, the Court determined that defendants
could be deemed employers if "defendants are 'agents' of a 'covered
entity,' who act on behalf of the entity in the matter of providing and
administering employee health benefits."70 By analogy, therefore,
doctors who are entrusted with the responsibility of certifying employees
as medically qualified for a particular job could be considered "employers" due to their exercise of control over the hiring decision. However,
no court has extended the Carparts ruling to physicians, and it is
un.knov,m whether any other circuits will follow the First Circuit's
precedent. 71
Regardless of the liability of physicians under the statute, the ADA
holds the employer itself ·responsible for discrimination which results
from its. association with other entities or individuals, such as medical
experts. The Act prohibits employers from "participating in a contractual
or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a
covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability
to ... discrimination.'m Thus, if an employer's relationship with a
physician who conducts medical examinations results in the discriminatory rejection of applicants protected by the ADA, the employer is liable
for a violation of the statute despite the involvement of a third party, the

67. 37 F.3d 12 {I st Cir. I 994).
68. /d. at I 7-18.
69. /d. at I 7.
70. !d.
71. Rejected applicants may also have private rights of action under state law relating to
financial harms caused by a doctor's negligent fitness evaluation. See, e.g, Armstrong v. Morgan,
545 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. ·I 978). In
Armstrong, an employee who was required to pass a physical examination upon being promoted lost
his job because the physician's report indicated that the employee was in very poor health.
Armstrong, 545 S.W.2d at 46. According to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, the plaintiffs
negligence action against the physician stated a valid claim: "Dr. Morgan owed Appellant Armstrong
a duty not to injure him physically or otherwise. If Dr. Morgan negligently performed the
examination and as a result gave an inaccurate report of the state of appellant's health, and appellant
was injured as a proximate result thereof, actionable negligence would be shown." /d. Similarly, in
Lashlee, an employee sued the employer's consulting psychologist, for "libel, negligence or malpractice, interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress .... "
Lashlee, 570 F.2d at 107.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994).
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doctor, with whom the employer had a professional anangement. That
is, if a qualified individual protected by the ADA is rejected by an
employer because the doctor erroneously deemed him or her incapable
of performing job duties for medical reasons, the employer is liable for
the decision under the ADA. 73
The regulations promulgated under the .ADA specifically provide
that "[t]he results of such [medical] examination shall not be used for
any purpose inQonsistent with ... [the ADA]." 74 Consequently, the
employer's responsibility for compliance \Vith the statute does not end
once it refers a candidate to a physician for a pre-employment medical
e)camination. It is the employer's duty to insure that the ultimate decision
as to whether to hire an individual in light of the doctor's findings does
not defy federal law.
In Piquard v. City of East Peoria/ 5 the court explained that
"[s]ection 12112(0)(2) was ... intended to prohibit 5Jii entity fro'in doing
through a contractual relationship what it may not do directly." 76 In
some cases discrimination might result not from an employer's innocent
reliance upon the erroneous opinion of a doctor whom it trusts, but rather
from far more malicious conduct. Some employers may attempt to
circumvent the statiJte via use of a medical examination. An employer
may extend conditional offers of employment to qualified individuals and
then ask its physician to identify and disqualify on "medical grounds"
any candidate_ who may cause the company to incur the cost of maldng
77
an accommodation, who may generate increased medical insurance
costs due to treatment of an existing medical condition, 78 or who may
file a worker's compensation claim due to the aggravation of past
79
injuries. Sii1ce it is milawful for the employer itself to reject a
candidate because of a disability or perceived disability if the individual
73. !d.
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(2) (1995).
75. 887 F. Supp. 1106 (C.D. Ill. 1995).
76. !d. at 1124 (holding that "[a]n entity may not contract with organizations which provide
employee fringe benefits if the relationship subjects the disabled employee" to discrimination
prohibited by the ADA); See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1IJ), at 36 (1990) ..
77. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (1994) ("[D]enying employment opportunities to a job
applicant or""employee who is an other\vise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is
based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or
mental impainnenis of the employee or applicant.").
78. Cf. id. § 12112(a) (stating that it "is unlawful to discriminate in the hiring of "a qualified
individual with a.disability b_ecause of the disability .... ").
79. See 29 C.F.R. pt. i630 app. § 1630.2(m) (1995) (providing that the determination of
whether a disabled individual is qualified "should not be based on speculation that the employee .
. . may cause increased health insurance premiums or workers' compensation costs.").
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can do the job with or without a. reasonable ac<::ommodation, 80 the
employer cannot utilize a doctor to aGhieve illicit goals. 81
V.

WHEN Is IT PROPER FOR AN EMPLOYER TO REJECT A CANDIDATE
.
BA~EIJ oN A DocToR's Ass:EssMENT oF His oR
l!ERl\1EDICAL CONDITION{

Although an employer rpust be c1:1utious in accepting a doctor's
advice not. to hire an applicant .due to. a.'. disabilitY, physicians may
nonetheless. proVide valuable infonliation . to 'an employer, and the
utilization ofmedical .exams·in the.hiring process .is not discouraged by
the ADA S. 2 Doctors Qan be trusted to. m~e accurate diagnoses of the
clinical con.ditions. of applicant!?, to evaluate, the risks characteristic of
varidUS;IDalapies, and to predict the course that C~rtain diseases will take.
Doctors, however, do not possess legal expertise relating to the ADA and
other federal regulations and often have· little, if any, knowledge ·of the
duties and requirements of the job to which the applicant would be
assigned. Because doctors areill equipped to decide whethe~ rejection of
an individllillwould ccmstitute an ADA violation, itis the employer who
must scrutinize the medical data n3ceived from the doctor and determine
its legaJ obligations With respect to the individual in question.
. How~yer, in some. instances !l. doctor may !n fact detect a disability
which prech,tde~ an individual from perfonmng the job duties in question.
in such ¢ases employers would be fully justified in relying upon the
doctor's. diagnosis to make a negative hiring decision. ,
First, the doctor m~y, discover that. an indhjdual has .a disabling
medical condition .which cannot be accommodated by the employer
without undue hard~bip: 83 The determination of whether an accommodation such as job restructuring, purchase of equipment, a change in work
schedule, or modification of facilities would impose ari undue hardship

80. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(5)(B) (1994).
81. See Patrick G. IJerr, Ethical Considerations in Fitness and Risk Evaluations; 3 OCCUPATIONAL MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS, 193, 207 (1988). The author potes the following:
. Unethical employers, sadly,. can present honest.ahd cimscientim,Is physicians with
insoluable [sic] prqblem5 concerning the ethical )landling of information about employees
and applicants. Persoi:mel directors who refuse to hire any individuai recommended "with
accorninodations," or who demand th~ results -of drug tests that they are plainly
incompetent to interpre~ can put physicians into a. position where professional honesty
is used to serve corporate irresponsibility.
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upon an employer is made on a case-by-case basis and is dependant upon
the cost of the accommodation. and the· resources . of the entity in
question. 84
·
'In ·one case, for example, a court determined that the Voice of
America was not required to . hire a severe diabetic for assignment
overseas as a radio engineer, since most ofthe foreign appointments were
hardship posts that were not near adequate medical facilities. 85 Due to
tile. nlinim~L;distrihution"of personnel overseas and the eiilployer's need
for operational :flexibility; the court ruled that promising the diabetic
ii:J.dividualthat he would work only in nonhardship posts would impose
an undue hardship upon the employer. 86 In the context of the Rehabilitation Act,· one· court. held that it was proper for the Army Corps of
Engineers-to orefuse to hire an individual with a heart condition· for the

84. The relevant provisions of the ADA establish the following:
(9) Reasonable. accommodation
The tefui "reaso~able accommodiltiori" maY include(A) maJa~g ~xisting facilities used by e!Jlployees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals wiLh disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modification of examinations, training materials or policies,. the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
(10) Undue hardship
(A) In general·
the .terril ''undue hardship" means an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).
(B) FiiCtors ,W be consipered
detednlning whether an adi::omrnodation would impose an undue hardship on a
covered entity, faCtors to be consideied include
(i) the. nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall fmancial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed
at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise
of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;·
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type, and location ofits facilities; and
(iv) the t)ipe ·of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
.composition; structure, and fuilctions of the workforce of such entity; the
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities· in question to the covered entity.
ld. § 12111(9)-(10).
85. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538
(1994).
86. See id. at 1188.
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arduous job of park technician. 87 The court reasoned, "[g]iven that only
two to· four other workers are· available. at any given. time to patrol the
150,000 acres at Clark's Hill Lake and in light of the agency's limited
resources,'' the employer could not accommodate the applicant without
undue hardship. 88 Likewise, the federal regulations explain that a
nightclub would not be required to hire an applicant with a disabling
visual impairment which forced the individual to work only in brightly
lit areas ifthe nightclub could establish that bright lighting would destroy
its ambience and/or make it difficult for customers to view a stage
show. 89
· ··In addition, certain conditions· cannot be accommodated at all due
either to their nature or to the nature of the job at issue. For example,
DOT regulations preclude individuals with particular conditions,
including epilepsy and insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, from serving
as drivers for companies governed by those regulations. 90 Thus, if a
doctor learned that an individual had one of the conditions that by law
precludes the candidate from employment, the employer would be fully
justified in rejecting that applicant based on the doctor's determination.
The ADA also allows employers to refuse to hire a ca~didate whose
p~l.ll·Dlu~•yrrrlPnt in ~ n~rtt("-....ll~r J;n.h ,un:n lrl "nncop ~ rliT,:::::a·r--t. t'hrp~t tn thPI hP-:t lt-h
or saf~ty of other indivi,duals in the workplace" 91 or to his or her own
physical welfare. 92 The regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA
providethat "[i]n determining whether an individual would pose a direct
threat, the factors to be considered include: 1) The duration of the risk;
2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; 3) The likelihood that
the potential harm will occur; and 4) The imminence of the potential
harm."93._, .
In Department of Labor v. Texas Industries/ 4 the Department of
Labor, Employment Standards Division cautioned that an employer
cannot assert a direct threat defense under the Rehabilitation Act unless
it makes a showing of a "reasonable probability of substantial harm."95
The court held that the employer had failed to show a sufficient risk of
-

T.o.

87.
88.
89,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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See Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (lith Cir. 1983).

Id. at 478.
See 29 C.F.R. 1630 app. § 1630.2(p) (1995).
See id. § 39l.4l(b).
42 u.s.c. § 12113(b) (1994).
See 29 C.F.R. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1995).
ld.
47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18 (1988).
ld. at 27.
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future injury to justify the rejection of an otherwise qualified cement
truck driver where a physician testified that her transitional vertebra and
prior back surgery made her more likely to suffer sudden pain or back
spasm than individuals who did riot have her medical history. 96 ·.
Similady, in the Texas Bus Lines case, the defendant contended that
Ms. Manuel posed a direct threat to the safety of passengers because she
would be unable to move quickly in case of an accident. 97 The Court
rejectedtth-e~cunipanyis~argument,":finding·the following:
[T]he ijkelihood of potential harm as a result of Maimel's weight ·
fuipedihg lier service to her passengers is too remote and ·does not
constitute grounds for a viable defense under the ADA. Despite Texas
Bus Lines'. assertions that Manuel· posed a "direct threaf' to the "men,
women and children passengers" that it transports, such theoretical
COIJ:C~rns do U()t s~rve as a. basis for the direct !br~at defense. An
employer cannot assert a direct threat defense unless it makes a
showing of a reasonable probability of substantial harm. 98

Thus, if a doctor detects a back condition or other medical symptoms
which might affect an individual's performance in a way that would
eridariger the empioyee, coworkers, or customers, the doctor must
evaluate both the kind of harin that could occur, and the likelihood that
it will occur.
To illustrate with greater specificity, let us focus upon the phenomena of back injuries and low back pain, which have been extensively
analyzed. by ~physicians specializing in occupational medicine. 99 One
article notes that "[s]tudies indicate that 21% of all compensable work
injuries and 33% of workers' compensation costs are attributable to low
back pain, resiiltipg in some 400,000 back injuries in the United States
per year." 100 Scholars have concluded, however, that "[d]espite
extensive research arid a large number of publications, scientific
understanding of the etiology and prevention of low back pain remains
weak and "frequently speculative." 101

96.
97.
98.
99.

See id. at 28.
See EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 979-80 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
Id. at 980.
See-Jay S. Himmelstein & Gunnar B.J. Anderson, Low Back Pain: Risk Evaluation and
Preplacement Screening, 3 OCCUPATIONAL MED.: ST. ART REVJEWS 255 (1988).
100. /d. (citations omitted).
101. /d.
. .
.
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Research has shown that up to seventy percent of X-rays taken
durip.g pre~employment examinations show abnormalities. 102 Similarly,
a study concluded that only fifty percent of patients between the ages of
forty and seventy who complained of low back pain had X-ray abnormalities, while twenty-two patients who did not suffer any back distress
showed abnormalities. 103 therefore, researchers have concluded that
"low back x-rays have loW" sensitivity and low specificity, and consequently a low predictive value." 104 Likewise, physical strength and
endurance tests, designed to determine the likelihood of future back
injury, were found to have a predictive value of ollly twenty-two
percent. 105 Since "there are few degenerative or developmental criteria
that can be applied to an individual to reasonably predict the risk oflow
back disability," 106 employers . should not utilize predictive screening
techniques for back problems as an exclusive basis for negative hiring
decisions. 107
Nevertheless, it is possible for employers to establish a "direct
threat" defense based on a doctor's findings, and such defenses have
been accepted by the courts. In Bradley v. University of Texas MD.
Anderson Cancer Center, 108 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court's
decision granting summary judgment to a hospital that had terminated an
HIV-positive surgical technician. 109 The court determined that the
nature of the technician's work created some risk of disease transmittal,
since be "often [c'ame] within inches of open wounds and plac[ed] his
band in the body cavity roughly once a day." 110 The court acknowledged that the risk of transmitting the virus was very small but found
that due to the potentially catastrophic consequences of an accident, the
technician posed a direct threat to the health and safety of patients and
thus was not protected by the ADA. 111 Similarly, an employer would
not be required to hire an applicant with narcolepsy for a carpentry job
involving the frequent handling of power saws and other dangerous

102. See id. at 261.
103. See id. at 261-62.
104. Id. at 261 (citation omitted).
105. See id. at 265.
106. ld. at 263-64.
107. See id. at 266-67.
108. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994).
109. See id: at 922, 935.
110. /d. at 924.
111. See id. (citing Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632-34 (E.D. Mo. 1991)
(deciding that an HIV-positive dental student is not otherwise qualified to perform invasive
procedures because the risks defy the axiom [of the medical profession] to at least do no harm}).
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equipment, if the individual often and unexpectedly loses consciousness
and no accommodation exists that would reduce or eliminate the
risk.m
Some applicants who do not constitute a "direct threat" under the
statutory definition but who learn of a ·potentially dangerous medical
condition through a pre~employment physical, may choose voluntarily to
declirie the job. offer in question and not to 'asSUme the risk of injury.II 3
In some_ i.Pstallc~S;,.~ ..d~o~tQr may inform the employer that a particular
applicant'sback i!llpai.rnlent or other condition presents only a very small
risk of. injury to himself or others in light of the job duties to be
performed. In Such a case; the employer would be prohibited from
withdrawing···. the -candidate's conditional offer of employment. 114
Nevertheless, the. applicant, upon learning of the diagnosis, may decide
to seek other employment whicli would not similarly jeopardize his or
her health.
VI.

WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY EMPLOYERS TO· INSURE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ADA WHEN UTILIZING
PRE-EMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS?

Employers are notfree to. blindly accept a doctor's recommendation
not to hire an individualbased .upon a particular diagnosed physical
condition. 115 If the ·applicant's rejection is deemed- by a judge or a jury
to violate the ADA, the involvement of a medical specialist in the
decision-making process will not serve as a defense for the employer.II6

· Employers would be well advised to take several steps to insure that
acceptance of a doctor's negative hiring recommendation will not
contravene the anti-discrimination mandate of the ADA. Employers
should provide their examining physicians with extensive information
regarding the jobs to which applicants will be assigned as well as
instruction regarding the ADA and any other applicable law, such as
DOT Regulations. In addition, the employer must independently analyze
any negative medical report received from the physician in order to

112. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1995).
113. See generally Patrick G. Den', Ethical Considerations in Fiiness and Risk Evaluations, 3
OCCUPATIONAL MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS 193, 200-01 (1988) (discussing such a scenario).
114. See 29 C.F.R. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1995).
115. See Texas Bus Lilies, 923 F. Supp. at 973.
116. See id. at 982.
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determine its responsibilities under the law with respect to the applicant
in question.
First, the employer should furnish the doctor with a detailed job
description for each applicant examined. If available, a variety of other
informational sources can also be provided to the physician to increase
his or her understanding of the jobs for which candidates are being
evalqated; These include "task analyses done by industrial engineering
or labor relations specialists to determine compensation rates, job task
inventories made by trainers, and functional job descriptions 'done by
nurses and physical and occupational therapists to assess the stresses on
muscles and joints and the skills needed to perform the work." 117
In addition, the physician should be given an opportunity to visit the
job site in order to observe employees engaged in the tasks implicated in
each job. If all tasks cannot be observed at one time, the doctor might be
supplied with videotapes of individuals performing their various job
duties. 118
In order to accurately assess each candidate's ability to perform his
or her designated job, the physician· should analyze a plethora of
information-about both the individual's physical condition and the actual
work duties required. A physician, for example, may find that a patient
has a particular back problem which requires a lifting restriction. Without
knowing exactly what lifting requirements the particular job entails, the
physician cannot intelligently judge whether or not to recommend
disqualification of the individual.
Secondly, doctors conducting pre-employment examinations should
be given intensive training with respect to the ADA. They must be
instructed that if they diagnose a physical condition that may limit the
applicant's ability to perform particular job duties, they cannot automatically deem the individual in question disqualified for that reason. 119
Rather, if the applicant is a qualified individual with a disability, 120 the

117. Suzanne H. Rodgers, Job Evaluation in Worker Fitness Determination, 3 OCCUPATIONAL
MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS 219, 221 (1988).
118. See id. at 222.
119. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (1995).
120. See id. § 1630.2(m). If the applicant does not fit within the definition of a "qualified
individual with a disability," the person is not protected by the ADA and need not be accommodated
by the employer. See id. Thus, if the person is suffering from a temporary condition such as a broken
bone, which prevents hiring at a particular time, the employer may advise the individual to reapply
at a later time without violating the law. See id. § 1630.2(j). Similarly, if the condition does not
significantly impair the individual in any way other than preventing him or her from performing the
specialized work duties of one unique job, the candidate will fall outside the purview of the ADA.
See id. § I630.2(j)(3)(i).
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einployerllnd the capdidate must first discuss what reasonable 11ccommo'"
dations could be prdvided to enhance job performance. 121 The doctor
niay faCilitate such discussions by suggesting possible accommodations.
Ftirthertnore, doctors·:iJ:iustleam that' if a candidate diagnosed with a
condition that might impede his' br her ability to function 'safely ahvorlC;
the doctor mtist •assess all of the factors teievanf to the "direct threat''
defense disch.s~ed. .~hov~. 122 A ooctor, -for exinnple, cannot declare an
i;nQiviclllaJ:tlDDtJQ_\YQ!:k,i_:L!h~teis ·only ·a inihimal chance of injury to
himself ofothei-s or· if the condition is a degenerative one 'and no harm
is likel:y to od:u:dbi many years. 123
.
'
_'SiririladJ;'theoerb:ployet must: discuss with the doctor the accuracy
and predi¢):ive yahie, pf the testing done for each individual who receives
a negativeJmingr~co~(mdation. If the testsgenerally do not effectively predict the eventual course oftliepatient's condition or the symptoms
to b~ suffered by the individuaL in the future, 124 the en:iployer must be
cognizant of these till.~ertaintie~.
'
·
·A tension may exist between the ADA standard and the doctor's
professional training 'and- inclination to take every precaution with each
patient to mfnimiz~ -if· not. eliminate ·the risk of any· harm. 125 While
doctors may ~e inclined -to- disq~alify aU. i~dividuals who have any risk
of injury, no matter .how small, -under federal law, individuals with
disabilities cannot be deprived of the opportunity to work and support
thems.elves · Unless •serious and specific hazards are imminent. 12•6 Thus
it is up to the emplby~r to· scrutinize the medical data garnered by the
physician and: to ..critically evaluate the doctor's assessment of the
individual'sabHityto wprk inlight of the strictures of the ADA.
Consequent:ly; iii: addition to educating its examining physicians, the
employer itseJfsh~uld designate a management level employee to serve

is

121. See 42U.S.C: § l2112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
Iii. See 29 c:F.R. § 1630.2(r)(l995).
·J23. See id..
124. As discussed earlier, back x-rays, for example, have a very low predictive value. See Jay
S. Himme~stein & Gunnar B.J. Anderson, Low Back Pain: RiSk Evaluation and Preplacement
Screening, 3 OCCUPAtJONALMED.: ST. ART REVIEWS255, 261-62 (1988).
125 .. The Hippocratic Oath includes the following affuin;!.tion: "[l]nto whatsoev'~r house you
shall enter, itshallbe fciphe good of the sick tci the Utinost ofyour power,you holding yourselv~s
far alooffroni wrong . , . you will exercise your art' solely for the ctire of your patients : ... " THE
NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1246 (Williiun H: H~s & Judith S. Levey eds., 4th ed. 1975); see
Patrick· G. Derr, Et[lical:ConsiderationS in' Fitness and Risk Evaluations, 3 OCCUPATIONAL MEn.:
ST. ART· REVIEWS 193, 194 (1988) (statipg that."a physician whO is indifferent to health and !if~ (or
worse, who knoWingly causes death, . disease, or disability) abandons medicine as an ethical
profession."), · ·
· .
' ·
·
'
126. See 4fU.S.C§ 12il3 (i994).
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as its ADA expert and to review l').ll negative hiring recommendations
made by the doctors. This specialist should review the results of the preemployment physical to deteimine whether the doctor's opinion is based
upon valid cpnical data established as a, result of thorough, accurate, and
reliable medlcal testing., PX is.!bi:!Sed upon the doctor's subjective and
unfounded a,ssumpt:lons, rnyths, stereotypes,. or fears.
·In the Texas Bus Lines.,case, tpe court determined that Defendant
wa,s liable for .discrimination because the doctor's examination report
clearly. indicated •it4at his opinion was n.ot supported by any objective
medical findings." 127 The doctor conducted no 11gility tests and bas~d
his concl~sjon about ¢e applicant's ip.ability to. respond properly to
emergency situations purely on his observation that "she had some
difficulty getting .out .of h~r seat in the waiting area and that she
'waddled' .slowly to the examining room, eight doors away." 128 . Had
Texas Bus Lines analyzed the doctor's conclusion and questioned his
reasoning. rather than blindly accepted his. decision, it would have very
likely avoided violating the law.
Thus, it would be wise for employers to question examining
physicians regarding the extent of testing they have conducted and the
basis for their medical conclusions .. If, for example, a doctor deems an
applicant unquali:fie~t.due to a back condition or other iimb impairment,
the erp.ployermust inquire as to the doctor'sassessment of the likelihood
and nature of the potential harm and the predictiv.e value of the medical
procedures conducted. In .cases where tpe ;~mployer retains lingering
que,stions regarding ,the validity of the doctor's evaluation after an
extensive dis.cussio11 of the exalltination and its results, it would be
prudent to send the applic~t to ~ different physician for a second
opinion.
.
.
. The steps· outlined above will not guarantee compliance with the
ADA in all instances. It is possible that an employer who educates its
examining physicians and conscientiously analyzes the doctor's
recommendation may still be found by a judge or a jury to have reached
the wrong conclusion in refusing to hire a specific candidate. Such
efforts, however, will vastly reduce the likelihood of a violation, and at
the very least, should ·enable the employer to eschew the award of
punitive damages to the plaintiff. 129

. 127. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. 8\]pp. at 9?3.
.·
.
128. !d. at 978.
129. Punitive damages are appropriate when a plaintiff proves that the employer engaged in
discrimination "with malice or with. reckl~ss indifference to the federally protected rights of an
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CONCLUSION

The ADA seeks to protect individuals who have been "subjected to
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such
in&vidmilscto participate in,
contribute to, society." 130 In an effort
to combatthe discrimination to which individuals with real or perceived
disabilities have historically been subjected, the law endeavors "to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards." 131
In order to effectuate the anti-discrimi11ation mandate of the ADA,
the courts must hold employers responsible for all of their hiring
decisions, including those based upon the advice of a physician. The
statute would have little meaning if employers could escape liability by
referring applicants to doctors whose hiring recommendations are subject
to no scrutin.y.
If reliance upon a doctor's opinion, no matter how incompetent or
ignorant, served as a defense under the ADA, employers might routinely

and

circumvent the requirements of the law, and countless individuals would

lose the benefits of its protection. If doctors were omnipotent under the
statute, Some employers might even be tempted to utilize physical
examinations in a manipuh,tive and deliberate fashion to exclude from
employment applicants who are protected by the ADA but are deemed
undesiraole by the employer. Thus, individuals fully capable of
performing the job in question could be rejected merely because they
might cost the company some money due to a history of cancer, a
disability requiring an accommodation, or a genetic mutation which
might increase the likelihood of a person's suffering a devastating illness
in the future. If not held accountable by law, employers could merely
instruct their examining physicians to disqualify all individuals who

aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(l) (1994). The purpose of punitive damages is to punish
the defendant for its unlawful conduct and to deter other employers from behaving similarly. See
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. ! 979). An employer that makes every effort to ascertain
that its hiring decisions are consistent with the ADA is unlikely to be judged to have acted with
malice or reckless indifference to the rights of the victim of a mistaken employment decision. See
EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1210l(a)(7) (1994).
131. !d.§ 1210l(b)(2).
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might pose a financial risk to the company and to attribute the rejection
on official documents to some fabricated medical reason.
Since, under the ADA, the employer itself cannot refuse to hire a
candidate due to a disability or perceived disability, it is senseless to
deem a protected individual's rejection acceptable solely because of the
participation of a doctor in the decision-making process. Employers must
independently assess the negative hiring recommendations of their
examining physicians to ascertain that they are based on valid medical
data and consistent with the requirements of the law. Only in this way
might we progress towards the goal of assuring "equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" 132
for all individuals covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act.

132. Jd. § 1210l(a)(8).

